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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
return the money, an action was commenced. The court found that the
complaint sounded in both tort and contract and decided that the opera-
tion of a New York stock account constituted the transaction of business
in the state. Additionally, under 302(a)(2), the court found that the
defendant's intention to defraud the plaintiff by receiving the proceeds
from securities which he allegedly knew were wrongfully in his account,
subjected him to jurisdiction for commission of a tortious act within
the state.33
This case further broadens the scope of CPLR 302(a)(2). On its
facts, it is clearly correct. Nevertheless the bench and bar alike must
remain vigilant to the danger of allowing "a plaintiff..., merely by
alleging that a contracting party never intended to fulfill his promise,
[to] create a tortious action in fraud.. . ." 3 Such simple conversion
of contract actions into tort actions must not be allowed.
CPLR 303: Service of summons upon attorney.
CPLR 303 provides that commencement of an action in New
York by one not subject to personal jurisdiction in the state is an auto-
matic designation of his attorney as his agent for the service of process
during the pendency of the action. It applies if the second action could
have been asserted as a counterclaim in the first action, had the latter
been brought in the supreme court. This section has now been amen-
ded 35 to incorporate by reference CPLR 308, thereby making the five
methods of service provided in CPLR 308 available when service is to
be made upon the attorney. Case law had previously held that only
personal delivery to the attorney was sufficient.36
CPLR 308(5): Substituted service permitted in divorce action.
CPLR 308(5) invests the judiciary with discretionary power to
devise modes of serving a natural person when all other statutorily pre-
33 Id. at 363, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 150. In Hertz, Newmark, & Warner v. Fischman, 53 Misc.
2d 418, 279 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1967), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 436, 446 (1968), the court held that it did not have jurisdic-
tion over a New Jersey resident who traded on the New York Stock Exchange through a
New Jersey branch of a New York brokerage firm. The defendant telephoned his orders
to the plaintiff's New Jersey representative who contacted the plaintiff's main office in
New York. The court stated that "where the agent and not a third party sues the princi-
pal, the agent's act will confer jurisdiction over the principal only if the agency was an
exclusive one." Id. at 421, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 100, citing A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda., 24
App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Ist Dep't 1966), discussed in The Quarterly Survey,
41 ST. JoN's L. REv. 279, 293 (1966).34 Stanat Mfg. Co. v. Imperial Metal Finishing Co., 325 F. Supp. 794, 796 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 355, 362 (1971).
35 L. 1972, ch. 487, at 1000-01, eff. Sept. 1, 1972.
36 Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dupper, 33 App. Div. 2d 682, 805 N.YS.2d
918 (Ist Dep't 1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. Rnv. 758, 773
(1970).
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scribed means have failed. Under this statute, virtually any method37
that meets the due process standard, i.e., which is reasonably calculated
to apprise the defendant of the action pending against him, may be em-
ployed.38 However, in divorce actions alone, DRL 232 mandates ser-
vice by publication if personal service within or without the state can
not be effected. 9
In Prince v. Prince,40 the petitioner, a New York City welfare
recipient, sought to compel the state or the city to pay the cost of pub.
lication of a divorce summons. The United States Supreme Court, in
Boddie v. Connecticut,41 had stated that publication is the weakest
method of service for giving notice and that due process may be better
satisfied by "service at defendant's last known address by mail and
posted notice."42 The Supreme Court, Richmond County, thus found
CPLR 308(5) a viable alternative to the "no substituted service rule"
of DRL 232.43 Finding that it had jurisdiction over the defendant, the
court, in the exercise of its discretion, utilized CPLR 308(5) to pre-
scribe a means for giving notice of the pending action.44 In lieu of
publication of the summons, the court ordered the petitioner to mail
copies of the summons to the defendant's last known address, his last
known employer, and his sister.45
Prince is laudable. It pragmatically implements the philosophy
of Boddie by reducing the cost of service in a divorce action to the ex-
pense of mailing, thereby avoiding the problem of who should bear
the onerous publication costs of the indigent. In addition, Prince, by
refusing to restrict non-personal service in a divorce action to publica-
tion, avoids the constitutional issue latent in the unique mandate of
DRL 232.46
CPLR 327: Recent developments in the area of forum non conveniens.
Case law4 7 and CPLR 302 have offered litigants greater access to
New York courts. This has necessitated the liberalization of the doctrine
37 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 308, commentary at 212 (1972).
38id.
39 Note, however, that CPLR 316(b) states that mailing of the summons should ac-
company an order for service by publication "unless a place where such person probably
would receive mail cannot with due diligence be ascertained .. "
40 69 Misc. 2d 410, 329 N.Y.S.2d 963 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1972).
41401 U.S. 371 (1971).
42 Id. at 382.
43 69 Misc. 2d at 411, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 412, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
46 See The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 768, 781 (1972).
47 See, e.g., Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1967), reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968); Seider
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